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Abstract
The United States Air Force (AF) has named Information Superiority the core
competency “upon which all the other core competencies rely”. In order to achieve
Information Superiority, deceptive communication must be minimized. According to
researchers, deception occurs when communicators control the information contained in
their messages to convey a meaning that departs from the truth. This research draws on
Biros, George, and Zmuds’ (2002) deception research model to determine if training to
detect deception will improve a person’s deception detection performance in a computermediated environment. A longitudinal experiment was conducted with AF participants
(N=119) where three separate training plans were provided as the treatments, and
measurements of the participants’ deception detection performance were taken before and
after each of the three treatments. Each measurement was taken in the form of six
judgment scenarios provided through three forms of computer-mediated communication.
Partial support was found for training improving deception detection performance and
reducing the number of false alarms in a computer-mediated environment, based upon the
first training treatment and a combination of the first and second training treatments.
However, contradictory results came from the second and third training treatments. The
most significant finding was that the performance of AF participants attempting to detect
deception in a computer-mediated environment could be improved by a training session.
Further research should explore the best training methods to improve the deception
detection performance of all AF members in order to achieve the goal of Information
Superiority.
ix

TRAINING EFFECTS ON JUDGMENT ACCURACY IN A COMPUTER-MEDIATED
ENVIRONMENT

I. Introduction
Background
According to Joint Vision 2020, information, information processing, and
communications networks are at the core of every military activity (Joint Vision 2020,
2000). Information is critical to success for the Department of Defense (DoD). Every
member of the DoD makes decisions based on information. However, commanders of
military units within the DoD make decisions that directly affect the defense of our
nation. “The commander with better information holds a powerful advantage over his
enemy” (Fogelman, 1995:7). Since information is so valuable, the Air Force has named
Information Superiority the core competency “upon which all the other core
competencies rely” (AFDD 2-5, 1998:2). Information Superiority is defined as, “The
capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” (Joint Vision 2020, 2000:8).
Information flows through different media. Media defined by Webster’s
Dictionary is “an intervening substance through which something else is transmitted or
carried on.” Examples of the different forms of media that information flows through
include: face-to-face communication, voice communication over distances (telephones),
text communication (letters, e-mail, etc.), video, and images (Baltes, Dickson, Sherman,
Bauer, and LaGanke, 2002). Nearly every form of media can be processed using a
computer, i.e. computer-mediated communication (CMC). CMC has become a key
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enabler for communications within the private sector, allowing for new ways to
accomplish work for groups separated by time and space (Baltes et al., 2002).
Furthermore, the military realizes the benefits of CMC. For example, a commander may
not be able to have face-to-face communication with a fellow commander on the other
side of the world, but through the use of technology, a video-teleconference could be
established to simulate a face-to-face communication. As this example shows, CMC
provides a powerful tool for commanders, and thus for the DoD in defending our nation.
A commander can collect and process all the information he/she needs to make a decision
through a computer mediated environment.
Information and the computer mediated environment that allow commanders to
collect, process and disseminate information are key enablers to achieving the goal of
“decision superiority.” However, while “decision superiority” offers many advantages, it
also creates vulnerabilities that our adversaries can exploit (Joint Vision 2020, 2000).
Information, and the media used to deliver it, need to be protected to maintain “decision
superiority.” This phenomenon renders Information Assurance a necessity (AFDD 2-5,
1998).
Information Assurance is defined as “…those measures to protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity,
and nonrepudiation (ability to confirm source of transmission and data)” (AFDD 2-5,
1998). Information Assurance covers a broad spectrum of information and information
technology defense. The spectrum ranges from physical security of the information
technology (e.g., guarding against unauthorized access), all the way to information
manipulation by “trusted” users of the information. AFDD 2-5 states that manipulation
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of information systems can cause incorrect information to influence a commander’s
decision making or even destroy a commander’s confidence in his/her information
systems. Strategic information manipulation has also been seen as an important area for
study within organizations in the private sector (Zmud, 1990).
Deception is one type of information manipulation which is particularly
devastating to decision superiority. According to researchers, deception occurs when
communicators control the information contained in their messages to convey a meaning
that departs from the truth (Burgoon and Buller, 1996). However, it has been estimated
that the receiver of a deceptive communication has only a 50 percent chance to
successfully determine whether or not that communication was deceptive (DePaulo and
DePaulo, 1989; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Feeley and deTurck, 1995).
Researchers have shown that individuals trained on reliable cues of deception
(e.g., adaptors, pauses, speech errors) are capable of improved deception detection
performance (deTurck, Harszlak, Bodhorn, and Texter, 1990; deTurck, 1991; Porter,
Woodworth, and Birt, 2000; Zuckerman, Koestner, and Alton, 1984). Furthermore, error
detection from stored data may be improved (Klein and Goodhue, 1997). Researchers
have recently begun to study training to improve deception detection in a computermediated environment because training has been able to improve deception detection in
face-to-face situations.

Problem Statement
Since successful deception detection is so difficult to achieve in any environment,
it presents an excellent opportunity for academic study. The research proposed here will
develop an answer to the question, “Does training improve deception detection
3

performance in a computer-mediated environment?” In order to improve the odds of
detecting deception and achieve “decision superiority,” training users to detect deception
will be accomplished. Specifically, the training will focus on teaching individuals how to
detect deception in a computer-mediated environment. CMC offers many new
opportunities for information to be disseminated and collected, but deception will
continue to be a problem when attempting to achieve “decision superiority.”

Scope
Deception and the study of its detection are broad areas of study. This thesis
effort will utilize a set of three training plans developed by experts (George, Biros, and
Burgoon, 2002) in the Communications research discipline to test the effects of training
on deception detection performance. The first training plan focuses on deception
detection in general, the background of research accomplished on deception detection
specifically, as well as an overview of what researchers show to be the best methods for
detecting deception. The second training plan focuses on the indicators that are evident
during a deceptive communication (deTurck et al., 1990; Kalbfleisch, 1985; Zuckerman
and Driver, 1985). The final training plan describes the cognitive heuristics, or mental
short cuts, that accompany deceptive communications, and how to utilize them to detect
deception (McCornack and Parks, 1986; Stiff, Kim, and Ramesh, 1992). These three
training plans will be measured on the level of deception detection performance the
participants’ exhibit upon completion of each training session.
Tests including deceptive and non-deceptive examples of communication will
measure the effects of the training plans. The examples of communication will be
provided in a computer-mediated environment. By this, I mean that each participant will
4

take the test before and after each training plan on a computer. The examples of
communication will include video, audio and text scenarios, on which the participants
will make veracity judgments. Using these forms of CMC will facilitate a further
understanding of deception and deception detection, and the CMC constructs will be
defined in Chapter Two. Biros, George, and Zmuds’ (2002) research model was used to
guide the development of this thesis effort (see Figure 1) because it implies causal
relationships between training and deception detection accuracy.
Once the experiment has been completed, the results will be analyzed and the effects that
each training plan had upon deception detection performance will be shown.

Figure 1. Theoretical Research Model
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Research Contribution
If the training plans improve deception detection performance, then the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) will have another tool to improve Information
Assurance within the Air Force and eventually the DoD. With improved Information
Assurance, the Air Force will be more prepared to successfully execute its mission
objectives to fly, fight and win. The research contribution for academics will include the
deception detection body of knowledge being expanded, as well as the provision of
empirical support to those researchers studying training effects on deception detection
performance in a computer-mediated environment. Academics and practitioners alike
will reap benefits within the Air Force community because the study will be conducted
on active duty Air Force officers.

Summary
This chapter discussed the importance of information, the role that CMC plays in
disseminating information to decision-makers, and the catastrophic implications of
deception altering decision-makers’ information. Furthermore, because of these factors
deception detection is critical to Information Assurance (AFDD 2-5, 1998). The scope of
this research was briefly outlined with respect to the model that Biros et al. (2002)
proposed.
The following chapter will review the literature on deception, deception detection,
computer-mediated communication, training, and specific training to improve deception
detection performance. Specific hypotheses will be proposed concerning the training
effects on deception detection performance in a computer-mediated environment.
Chapter Three will discuss the methodology used to conduct the testing of the hypotheses
6

formulated at the end of the following chapter. Chapter Four will provide the results and
analysis of the experiment proposed in Chapter Three. Chapter Five will present a
summary of the findings, limitations of the study, implications for the Air Force, and
suggestions for further research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
It has been estimated the receiver of a message has only slightly better than
chance (DePaulo and DePaulo, 1989; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; Feeley and deTurck,
1995) to successfully conclude whether the communicator is being deceitful or telling the
truth. According to researchers, “deception” occurs when communicators control the
information contained in their messages to convey a meaning that departs from the truth
(Burgoon and Buller, 1996). A “lie” on the other hand is to say something that is not true
or to imply a false idea. Deception and lies constitute the realm of information
falsifications: “misdirection, concealment, omissions and exaggerations,” (Ebesu and
Miller, 1984:418) of the truth. Within the Air Force, and to a larger extent the entire
Department of Defense, commanders rely upon information to make decisions (Joint
Vision 2020, 2000). Information falsifications provided to a commander may reduce the
quality of a decision. Therefore, it is pertinent that information falsifications within a
message are detected before a commander uses deceptive information to make a decision.
A human’s ability to evaluate a message for information falsifications is the basis for
deception detection.
The ability to detect deception has been studied for years (Biros et al., 2002;
Buller and Burgoon, 1996; deTurck and Miller, 1990; McCornack and Parks, 1986;
Zuckerman and Driver, 1985; Porter et al., 2000; Zuckerman et al., 1984). This chapter
discusses past research in this area and explores deception detection for the purpose of
decision-making superiority. Next, the research on computer-mediated communication
(CMC) will be reviewed. In addition, this chapter describes some of the types of human
8

deception detectors that are in use today, discusses where the field is headed and how
deception detection is an integral part of information warfare. Finally, training will be
discussed in terms of how it may be used to improve deception detection performance.
Based on the literature reviewed, the definitions provided, and past theoretical models an
adapted model for the study of training to improve deception detection performance in a
computer-mediated environment will be presented along with hypotheses based on the
adapted model.

Deception Detection
While there are currently no theories posited to aid deception detection in a
computer-mediated environment, future research might build on the well-known humanto-human deception detection theories of information manipulation theory (McCornack,
1992) and interpersonal deception theory (Burgoon and Buller, 1996). Interpersonal
deception theory (IDT) is a framework for predicting and explaining the dynamics of
deception during human-to-human interaction where a major factor in deception or
deception detection success is a person’s communication skills (Burgoon and Buller,
1996). Information manipulation theory (IMT) takes a different approach, where
deceptive messages derive from concealed violations of “conversational maxims”
(McCornack, 1992:4). Both of these theories will be examined and related within the
framework of deception detection in a computer-mediated environment.
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT)
“Deceivers must accomplish numerous communication tasks simultaneously.
They must plan and encode credible verbal messages while projecting a
believable nonverbal image; they must manage their emotions; they must attend
to their partner and keep the conversation running smoothly; they must send
desired relational messages to their partner and respond appropriately to partner
9

messages; and they must be discreet about any intentions to influence or deceive
the partner (Burgoon and Buller, 1994:155).”
The communication tasks described within the definition of IDT can all be
synthesized into a communicator’s social skills. According to IDT, the more socially
skilled one is as a communicator, the better he/she will be at deceiving or detecting
deception within a communication. That is, if a sender is trying to deceive a receiver,
there is a positive relationship between deception success and a sender’s social skills.
Furthermore, if a receiver is trying to detect deception of a sender, there is a positive
correlation between deception detection success and a receiver’s social skills. Empirical
studies exist supporting IDT in human-to-human deception detection capability (Burgoon
and Buller, 1996; Burgoon and Buller, 1994), but taking the next step to deception
detection in a computer-mediated environment is a difficult undertaking. Social skills
can be easily observed in a face-to-face interaction, but not so readily in a computermediated interaction. Information manipulation theory (IMT) provides the next logical
step to deception detection in a contextual format, in which a human is interacting with a
form of media as opposed to another human.
Information Manipulation Theory (IMT)
IMT provides four maxims of communication that when violated can be
considered attempts at deception in communication. These maxims can be applied to any
media, so IMT is a more general theory than IDT, where face-to-face deception detection
is the main focus. The four maxims are (McCornack, 1992:9-13):
Quantity. The maxim of Quantity refers to a person's expectations that a
conversation will be as informative as possible. Information omission is not
expected. If information is omitted, then there is an expectation of deception in
the communication.
10

Quality. The maxim of Quality refers to a person's expectation of being
presented with information that is truthful and complete. Obviously, if
information is not truthful or the information is purposefully ambiguous, then
there is deception in the communication.
Relation. The maxim of Relation illustrates the expectation of contributing
relevant information to a conversation. That is, a communication is expected to
“get to the point.” If the communication avoids relevant information, then there is
deception in the communication.
Manner. The maxim of Manner relates to how things are said rather than what is
said. For example, if a user of a system expects a communication in a certain
format, and that communication is not in the expected format, then there is
deception in the communication.
IMT relies upon maxims of communication, where IDT relies more on the social
skills of both the sender and receiver (Burgoon et al., 1995). Because IMT relies upon
maxims of communication, this theory can be more aptly applied to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment. For example, a military contracting officer attempting
to detect deception in an e-mail message from an unscrupulous civilian contractor could
use IMT to study the message. The military officer would check for omitted data from
the contractor’s message through the Quantity maxim, or whether or not the message
included relevant information through the Relation maxim. However, the use of IDT
would not provide a reliable way for determining deception because of the medium that
the message was sent, in this case e-mail. That is not to say that the two theories are
completely unrelated, but that they are targeted for different media. Both theories
emphasize the relationship between sender and receiver, but they are applied differently
through the medium used for communication.

Deception Detection Cues
A study of deception detection would not be complete without evaluating all of
the cues being provided by the potential deceiver, or sender, via analysis of their
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nonverbal, verbal, physiological and psycho-physiological indicators. Conscious and
unconscious signals indicate probing points where further investigation is required to
ascertain whether or not the sender is attempting to deceive or lie to the receiver of a
message (Buller and Burgoon, 1994; Burgoon et al., 1995; DePaulo, 1992; Zuckerman
and Driver, 1985).
According to Zuckerman and Driver (1985), nonverbal cues that are significantly
associated with deception include the following: increased pupil dilation and blinking
rates, less facial segmentation (feigned versus genuine smiles), more bodily segmentation
(restless trunk and limb movement) and adaptors. Adaptors are activities in which the
sender is moving his/her hand while touching their body, such as scratching (deTurck and
Miller, 1985). Zuckerman and Driver (1985) also identified that deceptive messages
contain the following paralinguistic (i.e., the set of nonphonemic properties of speech,
such as speaking tempo, vocal pitch, and intonational contours, that can be used to
communicate attitudes or other shades of meaning – Webster’s Dictionary) cues: shorter
response length, higher speech pitch, and increased speech errors, and hesitations.
Nonverbal cues must be studied along with verbal cues to detect deception.
Verbal cues are obtained from the actual speech or written language. According
to Zuckerman and Driver (1985), verbal behaviors associated with deception include:
more negative statements, increased speech errors, more speech hesitations, and
increased leveling (overgeneralizations). Conveying the truth up to a certain point and
the use of stalling tactics, as well as the exclusion of negative aspects of the story and an
unwavering desire to fill the silence of a room (Navarro and Schafer, 2001) are further
examples of verbal indicators of deception.
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Deception occurs in prominent locations where the verbal and nonverbal cues
may be evident. According to Henahan, investigators analyzed President Clinton’s
testimony in which he denied any sexual relationships with his intern, Monica Lewinsky.
The analysis measured 20 verbal and nonverbal indicators that were observed. The
analysis reported large increases in President Clinton’s verbal and nonverbal behavior
including: leaning, drinking and swallowing, hand-to-face touching, averting the gaze,
reduction in blinking, qualifiers and modifiers, expanded contractions, denials, speech
errors and stuttering (Henahan, 1999). The percentages of increased indicators ranged
from 63% to 1733%, with the majority of percentages over 100%.
Examples of written deception are continuously being presented in reference to
the alcohol and tobacco industries (Hacker and Steinhardt, 1997). Currently, the wine
industry is reporting coronary health benefits of drinking moderate amounts of wine. The
Center for Science in the Public Interest is publicly opposing this statement saying that
the Wine Industry failed to report significant results of the study. Some of the omitted
statements include the researcher inferring a potential link between breast cancers and
drinking (even at moderate doses) and that several people react poorly overall to alcohol
and can easily become addicted.
Similarly, the Non-Smokers Rights Association (NSRA) has pointed out the
tobacco industry’s deceitfulness in labeling cigarettes as “light” (low in tar content) when
in fact the contents of light cigarettes are almost identical to regular cigarettes. The
NSRA believes that smokers concerned about their health turned to this “light” product
when they may have quit had they realized there really was not a significant difference in
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tar content. Deception occurs in many industries and to many audiences, but detecting
the deception is extremely difficult.
The final indicators to deception are physiological and psycho-physiological.
Physiological indicators include galvanic skin resistance (e.g., sweaty palms) as well as
breathing and heart rates. The psycho-physiological indicator is brainwave activity, or
cognitive processing (Farwell and Richardson, 1993). However, unless there is a way to
measure these psycho-physiological and physiological indicators from a human message
sender during a CMC, they are useless in detecting deception in a computer-mediated
environment.

Decision-Making in a Computer-Mediated Environment
Choosing the appropriate medium for communication is an important
undertaking. This is especially true as the military relies more and more on information
systems to accomplish daily tasks. The following quotation from Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-5 illustrates this concept,
“The Air Force’s increased ability to access, process and store information,
coupled with its ever-increasing dependence on information systems and
information infrastructures have driven the Air Force to reexamine and redefine
how it integrates information-related activities into its functions (AFDD 2-5,
1998:5).”
Communication media differ in their ability to facilitate understanding. Media
can be identified as low or high in “richness” based on their capacity to impart meaning.
Daft, Lengel, and Trevino (1987) ranked media channels from high to low in their
capacity to impart meaning: (1) face-to-face, (2) telephone, (3) addressed documents, and
(4) unaddressed documents. The notion of media “richness” led researchers to propose a
Media Richness Theory (Daft and Lengel, 1986 and Daft et al., 1987). They defined
14

media richness as the ability of information communicated on the medium to reduce
equivocality, and based it on four criteria: speed of feedback, cue multiplicity, language
variety, and personal focus. Media having higher degrees of each of these criteria are
considered “richer.” Studies have shown that for decision-making, the media chosen for
communication made a difference in the outcome of the task performed (Hedlund et al.,
1998; Daft et al., 1987; Olaniran, 1995). For the purposes of this thesis effort, computermediated communication will entail video, voice and data excerpts from communications
that took place in an interview setting. While none of these CMC’s is face-to-face, they
do range from “rich” media (video) to “lean” media (data) on the continuum of media
richness. The choice was made to study CMC because of the increased reliance placed
on information technology as a means of communication.
Within the Air Force, “dominating the information spectrum is as critical to
conflict now as controlling air and space, or occupying land was in the past, and is
viewed as an indispensable and synergistic component of aerospace power” (AFDD 2-5,
1998:5). The United States military’s reliance upon information systems exacerbates our
vulnerability to deception. Joint Vision 2020 clearly states the importance of information
technology to the war-fighter in coming years, and to accomplish this information
superiority must be achieved. To ensure that information superiority is attained and
sustained, military researchers are expanding the deception detection body of knowledge
from IDT and IMT to theories that enhance deception detection within computermediated environments. Evolving the current research that explores human-to-human
deception detection to increase our military personnel’s ability to detect deception when
working within a computer-mediated environment to accomplish a mission is critical.
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The following examples illustrate how deception could be used to affect our
military operations: field informants may omit critical details about suspicious activities,
disinformation campaigns (such as before the D-Day invasion in WWII) may direct
attention to bogus operations away from real ones, opponents may leak information that
exaggerates or downplays the state of their weapons arsenals and make public speeches
that conceal their true intentions, intelligence analysts may be equivocal about their
confidence in their data or the thoroughness of their analysis. Thus, deception detection
research is important in continued development of new ways for our military to ensure
information and decision-making superiority. The high priority Joint Vision 2020 is
placing on information and decision superiority will continue to push deception detection
research forward. Deception detection and deception are also key parts to the
information warfare puzzle.
“Information Warfare is information operations conducted to defend the Air
Force’s own information and information systems or conducted to attack and
affect an adversary’s information and information systems. This warfare is
primarily conducted during times of crisis or conflict. However, the defensive
component, much like air defense, is conducted across the spectrum from peace to
war,” (AFDD 2-5, 1998:1).
This statement asserts that deception detection is an integral part of assuring our
information systems are providing accurate, secure information to the war-fighter both in
time of peace and war operations. According to Libicki, there are seven forms of
information warfare:
(i) command-and-control warfare, (ii) intelligence-based warfare (which consists
of the design, protection, and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to
dominate the battle space), (iii) electronic warfare, (iv) psychological warfare (in
which information is used to change the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes), (v)
"hacker" warfare (in which computer systems are attacked), (vi) economic
information warfare (blocking information or channeling it to pursue economic
dominance), and (vii) cyber warfare (Libicki, 1995:1).
16

Deception and deception detection are a part of each and every one of Libicki’s
seven forms of information warfare, because they both are ways information can be
manipulated. Earlier examples provide a framework for scenarios where deception and
deception detection could be viewed as one of the seven forms of information warfare.

Deception Detection in a Computer-Mediated Environment
Deception detection research has primarily been focused on human-to-human
interactions. This research will continue because there is still much to be learned about
detecting deception in human-to-human interactions. However, with the recent explosion
of information system (IS) use and human reliance on information systems to accomplish
their work, computer-mediated deception detection is becoming the next frontier for
deception detection researchers (Klein and Goodhue, 1997; Muir, 1987, Parasuraman,
1987).
Computer-mediated deception detection involves a human interacting with an
information system and determining whether the information garnered from the IS was
correct or had been tampered with. For example, imagine an air traffic controller, Joe
Smith, using an IS to keep track of airspace around a busy airport. Hundreds of planes
were taking off and landing, while Joe Smith relied upon an IS to update him if there
were any problems with the flight paths (Muir, 1987; Parasuraman 1987). Suppose data
in the air traffic control IS was altered to change the elevation of the runway by a
malicious deceiver. Would Joe Smith be able to detect the deceptive data, or would he
rely on the “trusted” IS to guide the airplanes to land at the airport?
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This is an extreme, yet important example. There are a number of problems
that can be identified in connection with reliance upon information systems. IS users,
like Joe Smith in the example, learn to become dependent upon information systems to
do their job. Automation of the air traffic control may lead to user complacency or
boredom which would cause the user to accept whatever information the IS was
producing as factual, correct data (Millar and Millar, 1997). If Joe Smith was unable to
understand that the data had been manipulated in the IS, airplanes may have crashed.
User dependence on information systems to meet their occupational needs would make
them even more susceptible to information manipulation by a deceiver (Klein and
Goodhue, 1997; Muir, 1987, Parasuraman, 1987).
To help improve detection of deception, automated tools have been and still are
being investigated to assist the interviewer with the decision process along with more
training. The most well known tool currently being used today is the polygraph or lie
detector test, which has been tested and used in the United States since 1897. The
polygraph has been used to assist with numerous areas of criminal investigations and job
interviews carried out by both the private sector and the Department of Defense. The
polygraph is a physiological tool that measures respiratory response through collectors
placed on the chest and abdominal areas, sweat gland activity through nodes attached to
the ring and index fingers, and cardiovascular activity by calculating blood pressure. The
principle idea behind this test is that the fear of being caught in the lie creates anxieties
and arousals within the body and thus multiple physiological changes. The investigator
has the responsibility of collecting and analyzing the nonverbal and verbal
communication to perform the overall analysis (Polygraph Clarification Services, 2002).
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Training to Improve Deception Detection Performance
As stated in the previous section, there are many tools to aid in deception
detection. However, they all measure physiological or psycho-physiological indicators
that require the sender of the CMC to be physically analyzed by a machine. It is
generally not feasible to analyze the sender of a CMC for physiological or psychophysiological indicators; therefore another means of deception detection must be sought.
Research has shown that training on the reliable verbal and nonverbal indicators of
deception may improve a receiver’s detection performance (deTurck et al., 1990;
deTurck, 1991; Porter et al., 2000; Zuckerman et al., 1984). Therefore, the lack of
physiological or psycho-physiological indicators in a CMC may be overcome. However,
CMC removes a receiver’s ability to examine all of a sender’s behaviors (Buller and
Burgoon, 1996). That is, the “leaner” the media, the less information a receiver has
access to when attempting to make a veracity judgment on a CMC. Text-based
communications, such as e-mails or online chat sessions, restrict access to visual cues and
allow the receiver to analyze only the linguistic and some paralinguistic cues (Rice,
1993). “Richer” media, such as telephone or video conferencing, allow access to the
majority of cues. It is within this austere computer-mediated environment that the
deception detection performance of individuals’ will attempt to be improved.
As discussed earlier, research has shown that training on the reliable verbal and
nonverbal indicators of deception may improve a receiver’s detection performance
(deTurck et al., 1990; deTurck, 1991; Porter et al., 2000; Zuckerman et al., 1984).
Furthermore, error detection from stored data may be improved (Klein and Goodhue,
1997). Traditional training, or “training where a time lag exists between when the
training occurs and when the task to which the training is to be applied takes place,”
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(Biros et al., 2002:4) based on the reliable verbal and nonverbal indicators of deception
should improve deception detection performance. False alarms, or “non-deceptive data
incorrectly identified as being deceptive,” (Biros et al., 2002:4) occur when individuals
are highly aroused or suspicious (Miller and Stiff, 1993; Parasuraman, 1984; Stiff et al.,
1992). Traditional training, by its definition, allows for a time lag between when the
training is given and when it is to be applied to a task. Because of this time lag, there
should be less suspicion and arousal leading to a negative effect on false alarms. Thus,
the following hypotheses were developed:
H1a: Traditional training to detect deception in a computer-mediated environment
(voice, video and data) will be positively associated with detection success.
H1b: Traditional training to detect deception in a computer-mediated environment
(voice, video and data) will be negatively associated with the occurrence of false
alarms.
However, according to Navarro and Schafer (2001), individuals trained in
deception detection tend to lose their abilities over time if they do not practice what they
have learned. Due to this suggestion, just-in-time training, or “training that occurs
immediately before the target task takes place,” (Biros et al., 2002:5) is likely to prove
more effective than traditional training (Gilleard, 1996; Globerson and Korman, 2001;
Lin and Su, 1998; Kester et al., 2001). Unfortunately, because the just-in-time training is
conducted with a specific task in mind (i.e. in this case deception detection) an
individual’s suspicion may be aroused, thus having a positive effect on false alarms
(Burgoon et al., 1994; Parasuraman, 1984; Toris and DePaulo, 1985). Thus, the
following hypotheses were developed:
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H2a: Just-in-time training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be positively associated with detection
success.
H2b: Just-in-time training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be positively associated with the
occurrence of false alarms.
With a combination of traditional and just-in-time training, it is expected that the
deception detection performance will be at the highest level, as well as the occurrence of
false alarms. The logic that applies to each form of training individually should hold true
for the combination. Thus, the following hypotheses were developed:
H3a: The combination of traditional and just-in-time training to detect deception
in a computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) will be positively
associated with detection success.
H3b: The combination of traditional and just-in-time training to detect deception
in a computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) will be positively
associated with the occurrence of false alarms.
Figure 2 is the proposed research model for the study of training effects on
deception detection performance in a computer-mediated environment. The model was
adapted from Biros, George, and Zmuds’ (2002) research model for inducing sensitivity
to deception in order to improve decision-making performance (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Proposed Research Model

Summary
This chapter discussed the theories and components that make up deception
detection. CMC was defined and discussed within the realm of deception detection. A
theoretical model was proposed for studying the training effects on deception detection
performance in a computer-mediated environment. Both academics and practitioners
benefit from understanding the theories of deception and deception detection.
Researchers may use this information to increase the computer-mediated deception
detection body of knowledge. Practitioners may use this information to develop
automated deception detectors for installation on information systems. The forms of
deception detection were explored with respect to the decision-making process and how
they are an integral part of Libicki’s (1995) seven forms of information warfare.
Hypotheses were posited and the constructs were defined with respect to deception
detection, training and the computer-mediated environment within which individuals will
be trained to detect deception.
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The next chapter will discuss the research methodology used to test the
hypotheses suggested in this chapter. Specifically, the longitudinal experiment will be
detailed and the groups that will be trained will be discussed. Chapter Four will discuss
the data analysis from the longitudinal experiment. Chapter Five will discuss the
research findings, any limitations that were found in the experiment, and suggestions will
be made for further research.
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III. Methodology
Overview
Chapter One described the research problem, provided background information,
and Chapter Two discussed the current literature relevant to this thesis effort. A research
model was presented, and hypotheses were derived from the proposed model. This
chapter will describe the methodology used to investigate the research hypotheses
proposed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, this chapter will justify the use of an experiment
to test the proposed hypotheses, describe the relevant population, and provide the details
of the experiment performed.

Research Methodology
In order to test the proposed hypotheses from Chapter Two, an experiment was
the methodology chosen for this thesis effort. The experiment was collaboratively
designed by academics working on the research project described in Chapter One. For
this reason, some of the surveys and treatments in the experiment are beyond the scope of
this thesis effort. The methodology description will focus on the aspects of the
experiment that are related to the hypotheses of this thesis effort.
The effects of training on deception detection performance and the occurrence of
false alarms are the observations (O’s) of interest for this thesis effort. This means that
the treatments (X’s) of interest are that of deception detection training. In order to
measure the significance of the proposed hypotheses, a quasi-experimental nonequivalent
control group design was the methodology chosen for this thesis effort (Campbell and
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Stanley, 1966). This specific design was chosen, as opposed to the true experimental
pretest-posttest control group design, because the subjects were already assigned to
classrooms and their training would have been interrupted by random assignment into
new groups. However, the quasi-experimental nonequivalent control group design still
provides sufficient control in order to minimize threats to internal validity (Campbell and
Stanley, 1966). For each of the 3 sessions conducted for this thesis effort, the following
setup is utilized:
Subject (Trained) Group:
Control (Untrained) Group:

O X O
O
O

From the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two, the just-in-time measurements are
captured within sessions, and the traditional and combination measurements are taken
between sessions.
The timeline presented in Table 1, which presents an overview of the entire
experiment, reports the amount of time allotted for all of the experiment’s activities. As
illustrated in Table 1, the experiment was accomplished over four sessions, referred to as
sessions zero, one, two, and three. There was a one-week lapse between session zero and
session one, and two-week intervals between the other sessions. The only objective of
session zero was to perform preliminary data collection. The next three sessions included
assessing subjects’ deception detection abilities and knowledge level, training subjects to
detect deception, and administering other surveys.
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Table 1: Research Design

Session 0
AFIT Survey 0 (Demographics and
others)
One week lapse
Session 1
Overview Knowledge Pretest 1a
Judgment Accuracy Pretest 1a
Overview Training
Overview Knowledge Posttest 1b
Judgment Accuracy Posttest 1b and
Accuracy Feedback (on both tests)
AFIT Survey 1 (pertinent to other
research studies)
Two week lapse
Session 2
Cues Knowledge Pretest 2a
Judgment Accuracy Posttest 2a
Cues Training via three different
delivery modes (classroom, softwarebased, and a combination of classroom
and software)
Cues Knowledge Posttest 2b
Judgment Accuracy Posttest 2b and
Accuracy Feedback (on both tests)
AFIT Survey2 (pertinent to other
research studies)
Two week lapse
Session 3
Heuristics Knowledge Pretest 3a
Judgment Accuracy Pretest 3a
Heuristics Training
Heuristics Knowledge Posttest 3b
Judgment Accuracy Posttest 3b and
Accuracy Feedback (on both tests)
Debriefing and feedback

Time(min)
60

Time(cumulative in hrs)
1

Time(min)
15
15
60
15
15

Time(cumulative in hrs)
.25
.25
1.5
1.75
2

30
Time(min)
15
15
60

Time(cumulative in hrs)
.25
.5
1.5

15
15

1.75
2

60

3

Time(min)
15
15
60
15
15
60
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2.5

Time(cumulative in hrs)
.25
.25
1.5
1.75
2
3

Data Collection
An Internet web site (http://en.afit.edu/env/dds) was used to collect the
demographic information, as well as the knowledge and judgment assessment responses.
Removing the need for the researchers to transfer the subjects’ responses from a paperbased survey to an electronic format saved time and minimized the possibility of error.
Furthermore, this method allowed for an organized presentation of the data, as well as
immediate transfer of the responses to a database for interpretation and study.
The surveys and assessments were completed in a classroom setting with a
research administrator present. The training students’ were randomly assigned to one of
four groups. This was necessary for one of the previously mentioned research studies
that accompanied this thesis effort. At the beginning of every knowledge and judgment
assessment the training student was instructed to enter their assigned group number, and
four-digit identification number. The training students were tracked throughout the
experiment with the combination of these two numbers, allowing for the comparison of
demographic information and judgment accuracy. Instructions detailing every
experimental task were produced and given to each research administrator so that
consistency of the measurements and treatments was achieved between groups.

Population of Interest
The argument that deception detection is important to Air Force and Department
of Defense members was discussed in Chapter One, based on the Air Force and Joint
information operations objectives. According to AFMAN 26-2105, information
operation activities are largely the responsibility of communication and information
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personnel. Considering the Air Force is relying on the deception detection abilities of
communication and information personnel to detect deception, these individuals are the
population of interest for this study. The experiment was conducted on a military
installation that provides training to communications personnel. This venue provided the
largest possible sample (121) of communications personnel able to participate in this
study. The subjects took part in the experiment as part of their daily training curriculum,
and were informed the purpose of the experiment was to develop a training program for
deception detection. The research administrators organized the subjects in classes based
on the date they began their communications training. Eight classes, from fourteen to
seventeen subjects each, were available to participate in the experiment. In order to
reduce the impact of the experiment on the subjects, they remained in their previously
assigned classes. The research administrators highly recommended the subjects take part
in the experiment, but it was made clear that the experiment was not mandatory.
The vast majority of the subjects were Air Force officers. However, the study
also included some civilian personnel and foreign officers. All the subjects had at least a
bachelor’s degree, and some had obtained higher levels of education. The majority of
subjects reported spending over fifty percent of their workday on a computer. Most of
the subjects were relatively new to the communications field, although some reported
prior enlisted experience in the career field. Overall, the average amount of time in the
communications field for all subjects including prior enlisted time calculated to three
years. Appendix A provides a summary of the subjects’ demographics. Appendix B
includes a complete list of demographics questions posed. The total number of subjects
who provided usable data is 119. The study began with 121 subjects; however, one
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foreign officer chose to withdraw due to a language barrier, and another subject provided
unusable data.

Pilot Study
The objective of the pilot study was to test the technical feasibility of the
experiment, and obtain feedback on the design of the experiment and the instruments
used to collect data. The pilot study included a judgment accuracy pre and posttest, a
training session on the cues of deception, and several other measures of interest to other
researchers. The subjects in the pilot study, nineteen volunteer Air Force Institute of
Technology students, provided feedback on the readability of the instruments, the quality
of the scenarios used for the judgment accuracy assessments, and the content of the
lecture. In addition, the pilot study allowed for the verification of the technical feasibility
of the experiment. As a result of the feedback provided, some changes were made to the
presentation of the instruments. The complaints about the scenarios used for the
judgment accuracy tests were mostly dealing with the audio quality, so the poor quality
scenarios were removed from the experiment and replaced with higher quality scenarios.
The pilot study was beneficial for resolving many unforeseen issues before conducting
the experiment.
In addition to this pilot study, another institution collaborating in this research
effort conducted two other pilot studies. These pilot studies were designed to test the
appropriateness of the judgment assessments and the usability of the software based
training program. Using data from the pilot studies the judgment accuracy tests were
rated by difficulty level; this rating was used to balance the difficulty level of the pretests
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with that of the posttests. These subjective difficulty ratings will be discussed in Chapter
Five as part of the Limitations section. In addition, the studies returned favorable
feedback on the usability of the software-based training system, Agent99.

Permission to Conduct the Experiment
Given this study involved the topic of deception, the experiment was reviewed by
the Human Subjects Review board. An exemption to AFI 40-402 was requested and
granted by the Wright Site Institutional Review Board Chairman and the Air Force
Research Laboratory Chief of Aerospace Medicine. The exempt Protocol Request FWR
2003-0022-E authorized research involving human experimentation.

Experiment Execution
An overview of the experiment was offered earlier in the chapter and Table 1 was
presented to illustrate that description. This section will review in-depth the elements of
the experiment introduced in Table 1. Session zero consisted of the collection of
demographic information and other data collection not of interest to this study. Sessions
one, two, and three were very similar. Of the four groups in the study, three received
training and one (the control group) did not. Each session began with a knowledge
pretest and a detection accuracy judgment for all the groups. Then, the three groups
receiving training participated in a fifty-minute training session, while the control group
was released for a break. Next, all the groups took a knowledge posttest and another
detection accuracy judgment; upon completion of the tests all the groups were provided
with feedback on their judgment accuracy. Finally, the subjects completed surveys
measuring various items of interest to other research efforts. The following sections will
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provide further descriptions of the tests administered, the training provided, and exactly
how the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Two were measured.

Training Treatment
The training was the treatment in this experiment. Training was provided to
groups one, two, and three; group four was not exposed to any training. The session one
lecture provided a broad overview of deception topics and definitions of commonly used
terms. Session two training curriculum covered specific indicators, or cues, of deception,
and characteristics of truthful messages. Heuristics, or mental shortcuts that people use
to process information as a hindrance to deception detection, were discussed in the
session three lectures. The research administrators rotated between groups throughout
the experiment to prevent instructor bias. For sessions one and three, all the training was
provided by a research administrator using a Microsoft PowerPoint slide show as a visual
aid. Session two, however, was presented in three different formats, which will be
discussed next.
Session two built on the content provided in the session one overview lecture and
covered specific indicators, or cues, of deception. The session two cue training was
provided via three different delivery modes in support of another research effort. The
training lecture with an accompanying slide show was presented to one group. This
lecture also included examples similar to the interview scenarios used for the deceptive
judgment assessments, as well as military oriented examples of deception. In the first
training treatment group, these examples were projected on an overhead throughout the
lecture. Another group received the same content via a software-based training tool, or
31

Agent99. The Agent99 treatment group had access to a videotaped lecture, mirroring the
lecture provided to the first training group, and the examples mentioned above. Subjects
viewed the contents of Agent99 on a computer with a set of headphones. They were
given complete freedom to view all of the contents, in any order, within the fifty-minute
training period. The third treatment group was lectured with the same slideshow as the
traditional training group; however, the examples were not played during the lecture.
Rather, the subjects were given the opportunity to view the examples within the Agent99
software after the lecture was complete. Although different delivery modes were utilized,
all the groups were provided with exactly the same training content. Considering all
groups received the same lecture content, the delivery mode is not a concern to this thesis
effort. The groups that received training will be combined and be considered the
treatment group, and the group that did not receive training is the control group.
Each of the groups (including the control group) received feedback on their
accuracy judgments following the judgment accuracy posttest for each session. The
research administrator simply read off whether the scenarios were truthful or deceptive.
No further explanations of the messages were provided; the research administrator did
not elaborate on any deceptive cues the interviewee displayed or comment on what they
lied about. Past research would suggest (Zuckerman et al., 1984) the feedback would
have no significant impact on judgment accuracy because of the lack of content provided
about the message.
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Knowledge Assessments
Knowledge assessments were administered to all groups twice during each
session. Communications research experts created the knowledge assessments. The
assessments for each session were designed to cover the topic of interest for that
particular session. The pre and posttests asked the same questions in a different order.
The questions on the session one knowledge tests dealt with basic deception knowledge,
such as the definition of deception and what biases prevented detectors from making
accurate judgments. The session two questions were tailored to assess the subjects’
knowledge concerning deceptive cues, while the session three knowledge tests evaluated
the subjects’ knowledge of heuristics, or mental short cuts used to process information.
Appendix C contains a complete list of knowledge questions asked. The knowledge
assessments were not used to calculate detection or judgment accuracy for this thesis
effort. They were used to establish baseline knowledge levels for the subjects, as well as
verify that the subjects were actually retaining the knowledge they received during the
training treatments.

Judgment Assessments
The judgment accuracy assessments were the most important tests of the
experiment; these assessments measured the subjects’ judgment accuracy. The subjects
were third person observers of interview scenarios. The assessments consisted of six
interview scenarios in which the interview respondent was either honestly or deceptively
replying to the interviewer. Each test contained three truthful and three deceptive
messages presented in various media. The media levels of the scenarios were, from

33

highest to lowest richness level, video (with audio), audio only, or text; each test
contained two questions of each media type. The order in which deceptive versus
truthful messages were presented was randomly assigned, as was the order of the media
richness level of each scenario.
These clips were all developed from controlled experiments designed by experts
in the communications research field (Buller and Burgoon, 1994b; Burgoon et al., 1994;
Burgoon et al., 1999). The video and audio clips were all in an interview format; the
interviewer and interviewee roles were both filled by research participants. During the
interview the interviewer asked the interviewee emotional, factual, and opinion questions
and the interviewee responded to some of the questions truthfully and some deceitfully as
assigned by the researchers executing the experiment. The interviews were taped from a
concealed video camera for later analysis. These interviews originally included several
questions, and lasted up to fifteen minutes. For the purposes of this thesis effort, the
interviews were edited into clips containing only one lead question and any related
questions asking for clarification or further explanation of the response. The edited clips
ranged from one to three minutes in length. The clips were presented in video and audio
formats, and others were presented as transcripts for the text examples. A few of the text
examples were transcripts from face-to-face interviews, but the majority of text examples
were transcripts from online chat interrogations. These examples were developed during
a mock theft experiment where the interviewee was questioned about a missing wallet
during a synchronous chat session (Research Consortium, 2001). Some of the
interviewees were instructed to answer the questions deceitfully while others were not
given any specific instructions. The transcripts were presented to the subjects of the
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current experiment; they were given two and a half minutes to read the chat transcript and
assign a veracity judgment to the scenario.
Some researchers have criticized the use of third person observers as deception
detectors as outdated and unrealistic (Buller and Burgoon, 1996). However, it has also
been argued that observers “offer viable perspectives on interaction,” and that studying
observer ratings of veracity still remains important in deception research (Burgoon et al.,
1996). In this study, the third person observer role is actually quite realistic considering
the interest is in deception over electronic media. The text examples used are actually
chat session transcripts, which could be comparable to observing electronic mail traffic.
The use of the audio example is equivalent to listening to a conference call on a
speakerphone. Whereas, the use of the video examples could be equated with an
employee observing a high-level executive meeting that took place over a video
teleconference.
Standardized judgment test administration procedures were scripted and provided
to each research administrator. The research administrators first handed out a document
describing each of the six scenarios to the subjects. The research administrator would
give a short introduction to each scenario (see Appendix D for an example of the
document) and then project the scenario from a computer in the classroom. The video
and text messages were displayed on the overhead, while the audio messages were simply
played for the class over the computer’s speakers. The text messages were also provided
on the handout so subjects were able to read at their own pace. After each scenario was
displayed the subjects were instructed to record their answers, truthful or deceptive, both
on their handout and on the web site.
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Hypothesis Measures
In Chapter Two a set of hypotheses was developed suggesting that traditional,
just-in-time, and a combination of tradition and just-in-time training would be positively
associated with deception detection success. Furthermore, traditional training would be
negatively associated with the occurrence of false alarms, while just-in-time, and a
combination of tradition and just-in-time training would be positively associated with the
occurrence of false alarms. A false alarm, in the context of this experiment, occurs when
an individual incorrectly identifies a truthful judgment scenario as deceptive.
The judgment score average for each test will be computed by dividing the
number of correct judgments (i.e., successfully identifying a truthful scenario as truthful
and a deceptive scenario as deceptive) by the total number of judgments for the test (for
every test, six judgment scenarios are given) for each subject. The false alarm average
for each test will be computed by dividing the number of false alarms by the total number
of truthful judgment scenarios for the test (for every test, three truthful judgment
scenarios are given) for each subject. Tables 2, 3, and 4 describe how each hypothesis
will be measured.
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Table 2: Hypothesis 1 Measures

Hypothesis
H1a: Traditional training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will
be positively associated with detection
success.
H1b: Traditional training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will
be negatively associated with the
occurrence of false alarms.

Measures
1) difference of session two pretest
judgment score average and session one
pretest judgment score average (2a -1a)
2) difference of session three pretest
judgment score average and session two
pretest judgment score average (3a - 2a)
1) difference of session two pretest false
alarm average and session one pretest
false alarm average (2a - 1a)
2) difference of session three pretest false
alarm average and session two pretest
false alarm average (3a - 2a)

Table 3: Hypothesis 2 Measures

Hypothesis
H2a: Just-in-time training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will
be positively associated with detection
success.

H2b: Just-in-time training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will
be positively associated with the
occurrence of false alarms.

Measures
1) difference of session one posttest
judgment score average and session one
pretest judgment score average (1b -1a)
2) difference of session two posttest
judgment score average and session two
pretest judgment score average (2b - 2a)
3) difference of session three posttest
judgment score average and session three
pretest judgment score average (3b - 3a)
1) difference of session one posttest false
alarm average and session one pretest
false alarm average (1b - 1a)
2) difference of session two posttest false
alarm average and session two pretest
false alarm average (2b - 2a)
3) difference of session three posttest false
alarm average and session three pretest
false alarm average (3b - 3a)
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Table 4: Hypothesis 3 Measures

Hypothesis
H3a: The combination of traditional and
just-in-time training to detect deception in
a computer-mediated environment (voice,
video and data) will be positively
associated with detection success.
H3b: The combination of traditional and
just-in-time training to detect deception in
a computer-mediated environment (voice,
video and data) will be positively
associated with the occurrence of false
alarms.

Measures
1) difference of session two posttest
judgment score average and session one
pretest judgment score average (2b -1a)
2) difference of session three posttest
judgment score average and session two
pretest judgment score average (3b - 2a)
1) difference of session two posttest false
alarm average and session one pretest
false alarm average (2b - 1a)
2) difference of session three posttest false
alarm average and session two pretest
false alarm average (3b - 2a)

Summary
This chapter described the research design and methodology used to measure the
hypotheses presented in Chapter Two. The method of measuring the subjects’ detection
accuracy and the occurrence of false alarms was presented. In addition, the experiment
activities were described in detail. The following chapter discusses the results and
analysis of the data collected during the experiment. Limitations of the research,
implications for the Air Force, and suggestions for further research will be discussed in
Chapter Five.
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IV. Data Analysis
Overview
This chapter describes the results of the experiment and details the statistical
procedures used to analyze the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Two. The participation
rate is discussed and a statistical description of the subjects is provided, followed by a
statistical analysis of each of the hypotheses. Discussion and implications of the results
will be provided in Chapter Five, as well as limitations of the study, and ideas for further
research.

Description of Subjects
Although the original number of subjects expected in each class was sixteen, the
number varied from class to class. The class assignments were based on the date the
students were available to start training. Due to administrative problems and scheduling
oversights, class sizes ranged from fourteen to seventeen students. Overall, 119 students
provided usable data in session zero of the experiment. However, some of the students
were not present for every session. Session two only had 117 subjects, while session
three ended with a total of 115 students. This was a limitation of this thesis effort and
will be further documented in Chapter Five.
The subjects were divided into four groups, as described in Chapter Three for the
additional research efforts. However, only the trained groups were of interest to this
research effort. To ensure equivalency between treatment groups, the scores from the
first judgment accuracy tests were compared; group one had an initial detection accuracy
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of 51% (standard deviation (SD) = .04), group two had an initial detection accuracy of
47% (SD = .04), and group three had a 55% average (SD = .04), no significant
differences were found (F = 1 .11, p > .05). Overall, the mean pre-training detection
accuracy score of all the subjects who were to receive training was 51%. This is aligned
with past research, which suggests detection accuracy is no better than chance in most
cases (DePaulo et al., 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981). However, of interest to this study is
the analysis of the data in relation to the hypotheses proposed. The following sections
recap the hypotheses stated in Chapter Two, present the results, and report the
conclusions.

Method of Analysis
Testing Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b involved testing paired measures. In
order to simplify this test from a multivariate analysis to a univariate analysis, a derived
variable was created. The derived variable was calculated by taking the difference of the
paired values (Kachigan, 1991). A Student’s t-test, or simply t-test, was then performed
to determine if the difference is significantly greater (or less, in the case of Hypothesis
1b) than zero (α = .05). The results of the analyses are first discussed and then
summarized within tables in each of the following sections.

Analysis of Traditional Training
Detection Success
Hypothesis 1a proposed that traditional training to detect deception in a computermediated environment (voice, video and data) would be positively associated with
detection success. To test Hypothesis 1a, the difference between the session two pretest
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(2a) and the session one pretest (1a) judgment scores of each subject was calculated. The
average difference of the mean session two pretest (2a) and the session one pretest (1a)
judgment scores was found to be 22% (n = 89). A t-test indicated that the difference was
significantly greater than zero with a test statistic of 6.75 (p < .0001). However, the same
test was performed on session two with contradictory results. The difference between the
session three pretest (3a) and the session two pretest (2a) judgment scores of each subject
was calculated. The average difference of the mean session three pretest (3a) and the
session two pretest (2a) judgment scores was found to be -11% (n = 87). A t-test
indicated that the difference was significantly different than zero, but directly opposite
the proposed hypothesis, with a test statistic of -4.07 (p < .0001). In this study, subjects
performed significantly better at distinguishing truth and deception after receiving
traditional training for session one, but just the opposite was true for session two; thus
Hypothesis 1a was supported for session one, but not for session two.
Table 5: Hypothesis 1a Analysis

Traditional Training - Detection Success
Accuracy Scores
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
1a
91 .513
.216
2a
.727
.188
89 .624
3a
.192
2a - 1a
.215
.301
6.754
3a - 2a
87 -.111
.255
-4.066

p value

< .0001
< .0001

False Alarms
Hypothesis 1b proposed that traditional training to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) would be negatively associated
with the occurrence of false alarms. To test Hypothesis 1b, the difference between the
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session two pretest (2a) and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms of
each subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean session two pretest (2a)
and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms were found to be -31% (n =
89). A t-test indicated that the difference was significantly less than zero with a test
statistic of -8.62 (p < .0001). Again, the same test was performed on session two with
contradictory results. The difference between the session three pretest (3a) and the
session two pretest (2a) occurrence of false alarms of each subject was calculated. The
average difference of the mean session three pretest (3a) and the session two pretest (2a)
occurrence of false alarms was found to be 24% (n = 87). A t-test indicated that the
difference was significantly greater than zero with a test statistic of 6.90 (p < .0001).
This test showed significant difference at correctly judging truthful communication as
truthful after receiving traditional training for session one, but just the opposite was true
for session two. Therefore, subjects performed significantly better at correctly judging
truthful communication as truthful after receiving traditional training for session one;
thus Hypothesis 1b was supported for session one. However, Hypothesis 1b was not
supported for session two.
Table 6: Hypothesis 1b Analysis

Accuracy Scores
1a
2a
3a
2a - 1a
3a - 2a

Traditional Training – False Alarms
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
91 .480
.254
.169
.214
89 .401
.262
-.310
.340
-8.624
87 .238
.321
6.899
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p value

< .0001
< .0001

Summarizing Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 1a was strongly supported for session
one, but just the opposite for session two. Hypothesis 1b was strongly supported for
session one, but it was just the opposite for session two. This shows that traditional
training from session one had a significant positive effect on detection accuracy, but did
not have a significant effect on the occurrence of false alarms. Just the opposite was true
for the traditional training from session two.

Analysis of Just-in-Time Training
Detection Success
Hypothesis 2a proposed that just-in-time training to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) would be positively associated
with detection success. To test Hypothesis 2a, the difference between the session one
posttest (1b) and the session one pretest (1a) judgment scores of each subject was
calculated. The average difference of the mean session one posttest (1b) and the session
one pretest (1a) judgment scores was found to be 10% (n = 91). A t-test indicated that
the difference was significantly greater than zero with a test statistic of 3.43 (p < .0005).
However, the same test was performed on session two with contradictory results. The
difference between the session two posttest (2b) and the session two pretest (2a)
judgment scores of each subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean
session two posttest (2b) and the session two pretest (2a) judgment scores was found to
be -12% (n = 89). A t-test indicated that the difference was significantly different than
zero, but directly opposite the proposed hypothesis, with a test statistic of -4.77 (p <
.0001). In this study, subjects performed significantly better at distinguishing between
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truth and deception after receiving just-in-time training for session one, but just the
opposite was true for session two; thus Hypothesis 2a was supported for session one, but
not for session two.
Table 7: Hypothesis 2a Analysis

Just-in-Time Training - Detection Success
Accuracy Scores
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
1a
.513
.216
91
1b
.615
.170
2a
.727
.188
2b
.607
.143
89
3a
.624
.192
3b
.562
.171
1b - 1a
91 .103
.285
3.431
2b - 2a
-.120
.237
-4.766
89
3b - 3a
-.062
.234
-2.492

p value

< .0005
< .0001
< .0073

False Alarms
Hypothesis 2b proposed that just-in-time training to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) would be positively associated
with the occurrence of false alarms. To test Hypothesis 2b, the difference between the
session one posttest (1b) and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms of
each subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean session one posttest
(1b) and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms were found to be -8% (n
= 91). A t-test indicated that there was a significant difference to zero, but directly
opposite the proposed hypothesis, with a test statistic of -2.11 (p < .0187). Again, the
same test was performed on session two with contradictory, but more expected results.
The difference between the session two posttest (2b) and the session two pretest (2a)
occurrence of false alarms of each subject was calculated. The average difference of the
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mean session two posttest (2b) and the session two pretest (2a) occurrence of false alarms
was found to be 27% (n = 89). A t-test indicated that the difference was significantly
greater than zero with a test statistic of 8.94 (p < .0001). This test showed significant
difference at correctly judging truthful communication as truthful after receiving just-intime training for session one, but just the opposite was true for session two. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2b was not supported for session one, but it was supported for session two.
Table 8: Hypothesis 2b Analysis

Accuracy Scores
1a
1b
2a
2b
3a
3b
1b - 1a
2b - 2a
3b - 3a

Just-in-Time Training – False Alarms
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
.480
.254
91
.396
.248
.169
.214
.434
.191
89
.401
.262
.446
.230
91 -.084
.380
-2.113
.266
.281
8.940
89
.045
.294
1.443

p value

< .0187
< .0001
< .0763

Summarizing Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 2a was strongly supported for session
one, but just the opposite for session two. Hypothesis 2b was strongly opposed for
session one, but it was strongly supported for session two. This shows that just-in-time
training from session one had a significant positive effect on detection accuracy, but did
not have a significant effect on the occurrence of false alarms. Just the opposite was true
for the just-in-time training from session two.
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Analysis of Combination Training
Detection Success
Hypothesis 3a proposed that combination training to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) would be positively associated
with detection success. To test Hypothesis 3a, the difference between the session two
posttest (2b) and the session one pretest (1a) judgment scores of each subject was
calculated. The average difference of the mean session two posttest (2b) and the session
one pretest (1a) judgment scores was found to be 10% (n = 89). A t-test indicated that
the difference was significantly greater than zero with a test statistic of 3.57 (p < .0003).
However, the same test was performed between sessions two and three with contradictory
results. The difference between the session three posttest (3b) and the session two pretest
(2a) judgment scores of each subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean
session three posttest (3b) and the session two pretest (2a) judgment scores was found to
be -17% (n = 87). A t-test indicated that the difference was significantly different than
zero, but directly opposite the proposed hypothesis, with a test statistic of -6.77 (p <
1.000). In this study, subjects performed significantly better at distinguishing between
truth and deception after receiving combination training between sessions one and two,
but just the opposite was true between sessions two and three; thus hypothesis 3a was
supported between sessions one and two, but not between sessions two and three.
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Table 9: Hypothesis 3a Analysis

Combination Training - Detection Success
Accuracy Scores
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
1a
91 .513
.216
2a
.727
.188
89 .607
2b
.143
3b
.562
.171
2b - 1a
89 .096
.252
3.571
3b - 2a
87 -.168
.232
-6.767

p value

< .0003
< .0001

False Alarms
Hypothesis 3b proposed that combination training to detect deception in a
computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data) would be positively associated
with the occurrence of false alarms. To test Hypothesis 3b, the difference between the
session two posttest (2b) and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms of
each subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean session two posttest
(2b) and the session one pretest (1a) occurrence of false alarms were found to be -4% (n
= 89). A t-test indicated that there was no significant difference to zero with a test
statistic of -1.40 (p < .0821). However, the same test was performed between sessions
two and three with statistically significant results. The difference between the session
three posttest (3b) and the session two pretest (2a) occurrence of false alarms of each
subject was calculated. The average difference of the mean session three posttest (3b)
and the session two pretest (2a) occurrence of false alarms was found to be 28% (n = 87).
A t-test indicated that the difference was significantly greater than zero with a test
statistic of 9.09 (p < .0001). This test showed no significant difference at correctly
judging truthful communication as truthful after receiving combination training between
sessions one and two, but just there was a significant difference between sessions two and
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three. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b was not supported between sessions one and two, but it
was supported between sessions two and three.
Table 10: Hypothesis 3b Analysis

Combination Training – False Alarms
Accuracy Scores
n
Mean Std Dev Test Statistic
1a
91 .480
.254
2a
.169
.214
89 .434
2b
.191
3b
.446
.230
2b - 1a
89 -.045
.302
-1.402
3b - 2a
87 .280
.287
9.090

p value

< .0821
< .0001

Summarizing Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 3a was strongly supported between
sessions one and two, but just the opposite between sessions two and three. Hypothesis
3b was not supported between sessions one and two, but it was strongly supported
between sessions two and three. This shows that combination training between sessions
one and two had a significant positive effect on detection accuracy, but did not have a
significant effect on the occurrence of false alarms. Just the opposite was true for the
combination training between sessions two and three.

Summary
This chapter described the analysis of the data and presented the results of the
experiment. The analyses showed strong support for all aspects of detecting deception
regarding session one and the combination of sessions on and two. However, exactly the
opposite occurred for session two and the combination of sessions two and three. While
each of the Hypotheses were strongly supported or strongly opposed between sessions,
there is evidence to suggest that the training for session one and the combination of
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training from sessions one and two result in detection improvement and the reduction of
false alarms. Exactly the opposite occurred for session two and the combination of
sessions two and three, which suggests there may have been some errors in
experimentation. A discussion of these results as well as complete review of the
implications, applications, and limitations of this study will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overview
The focus of this research effort was to investigate how training programs impact
deception detection performance and the occurrence of false alarms when attempting to
detect deception. Hypotheses were developed based on past research findings and
current theory, and an experiment was performed to test these hypotheses. The findings
of the experiment are summarized in Table 11. This chapter will discuss the
implications, limitations, and suggestions for further research related to this thesis effort.
Table 11: Summary of Findings

Hypothesis
H1a: Traditional training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be positively associated with
detection success.
H1b: Traditional training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be negatively associated with
the occurrence of false alarms.
H2a: Just-in-time training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be positively associated with
detection success.
H2b: Just-in-time training to detect deception in a computer-mediated
environment (voice, video and data) will be positively associated with
the occurrence of false alarms.
H3a: The combination of traditional and just-in-time training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data)
will be positively associated with detection success.
H3b: The combination of traditional and just-in-time training to detect
deception in a computer-mediated environment (voice, video and data)
will be positively associated with the occurrence of false alarms.
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Result
Partially
Supported
Partially
Supported
Partially
Supported
Partially
Supported
Partially
Supported
Partially
Supported

Discussion
Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a proposed that training would have a significant positive
effect on detection success. Statistical tests supported these hypotheses when the session
one training treatment was utilized. Traditional and combination training, measured
between sessions, as well as just-in-time training, which was measured within sessions,
all suggested significant deception detection improvement where session one’s training
treatment was utilized. Therefore, session one’s training treatment does have a positive
effect on deception detection performance. However, for Hypotheses 2a and 3a, when
session two or session three’s training treatments were measured, there was not a
significant positive effect on detection success.
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b proposed that training would be associated with the
occurrence of false alarms. Specifically, Hypothesis 1b proposed that traditional training
would be negatively associated with the occurrence of false alarms, and this was
supported by the data analyzed in Chapter Four. Hypotheses 2b and 3b proposed that
training would be positively associated with the occurrence of false alarms. However,
they were supported when session two or session three’s training treatments were
measured, and not supported when session one’s training treatment was measured. This
is perplexing because Hypotheses 2a and 3a were supported when exactly the opposite
happened. The following discussion of results and limitations lead to an explanation of
this occurrence.
Traditional, just-in-time, and combination training all improved detection success
with respect to the session one training treatment. Likewise, traditional, just-in-time, and
combination training all reduced the occurrence of false alarms with respect to the
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session one training treatment. This second finding was unexpected and significant.
According to academics, an individual’s suspicion may be aroused with training that is
given right before a task is undertaken, thus having a positive effect on false alarms
(Burgoon et al., 1994; Parasuraman, 1984; Toris and DePaulo, 1985). However, the exact
opposite occurred with respect to the training treatments of session two and three. Justin-time and combination training within sessions two and three did not improve detection
success and was associated with the occurrence of false alarms.

Limitations
The results discussed suggest that the training treatment for session one was the
best in terms of improving detection success and reducing the number of false alarms, but
other factors may have influenced this phenomenon. Most notably, the fact that the
experiment was longitudinal suggests that the initial training treatment would have the
most impact. Simply stated, because that session was the subjects first exposure to
deception detection training. Furthermore, instrumentation, or “autonomous changes in
the measuring instrument,” could have led to the discrepancy within session two
judgment scores (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). The judgment scenarios that were used
to measure the subjects’ detection success and occurrence of false alarms were ranked
according to their difficulty level by other researchers associated with this experiment.
These rankings were subjective, and may have been erroneously skewed to have more
difficult questions for the judgment posttests administered at the end of sessions two and
three and easier questions at the beginning of sessions two and three.
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Other limitations in the research design could have prevented an optimal
investigation of detection accuracy. Miller and Stiff (1993) assert that generalizable
deception research procedures should provide subjects with motivation to detect
deception. It is acknowledged that this research design did not provide a sufficient means
of motivation to the subjects. In addition, the experiment administrators observed that
the group environment in which the experiment was conducted may have introduced a
confounding effect. A more desirable arrangement would have limited the visibility of
other subjects during the judgment tests to ensure facial expressions, comments, or
actions of other subjects would not influence veracity decisions.
Further limitations arose because the experiment was designed to explore
numerous topics, in addition to the areas of interest to this thesis effort. Feedback was
given to the subjects about their detection performance, which was not part of this
research effort. As well, the issuance of time-consuming surveys at the end of each
session may have fatigued the subjects. Regardless of these limitations, the findings of
this study are still useful to both practitioners and academics.

Implications for Practice
This study contributes to practitioners understanding of deception detection.
While this study has shown that Air Force communications and information officers are
not proficient at detecting deception, they may be trained to improve their deception
detection performance. If the AF intends to meet the objectives of information and
decision making superiority, the personnel responsible for information assurance must be
able to detect deception in communications. The Air Force, and any other organization
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that is concerned with detection of deception, should continue to study ways to improve
the detection accuracy of its personnel.

Academic Implications and Suggestions
This study provides many implications for academics and further research. This
research effort adds to the deception detection body of knowledge, especially in terms of
experimenting with practitioners within the military. Military personnel were able to
improve their detection performance after training, but further studies are needed.
Specifically, changing the method of deception judgment scenarios from third-person
observer to first-person interactive status in order to add more practitioner applicability to
experimentation. Furthermore, experimentation should be conducted in the most realistic
way possible, i.e., within practitioner task relevant scenarios, as opposed to contrived
judgment scenarios. Finally, training must be studied further in order to identify the best
way to improve detection performance.
There have been many studies that explore the effects of training on deception
detection performance, but there is still no universally accepted way to improve
deception detection performance. Researchers need to continue studying the best way to
train people to detect deception, until there is an accepted view. Experimentation and the
convergence of communications and media theoretical views offer the best road for
academics to improve deception detection performance.

Conclusion
Results from this thesis effort suggest that training does improve deception
detection performance, and may reduce the occurrence of false alarms. These results are
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beneficial to both practitioners and academics attempting to understand deception
detection and the occurrence of false alarms. Researchers should use limitations
identified within this study to improve studies of deception detection.
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Appendix A
Demographic Variable
Gender
Male
Female
Rank
2Lt
1Lt
Captain
Major
Lieutenant Colonel
Civilian
Education
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree

n

Percent Of Sample

103
16
119

86.6%
13.4%
100%

99
5
4
2
1

83.2%
4.2%
3.4%
1.7%
0.8%

8
119

6.7%
100%

112
6
1
119

94.1%
5.1%
0.8%
100%

Age
Average (years)

28.0

Years in Communications Career Field
Average (years)

3.0
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Appendix B
Demographic Information
Please select a Group
Group 1
Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Please enter the Last 4 digits of your SSAN?
Please select your gender
Male Female
Please select your Rank
2LT 1LT CAPT MAJ
Please enter your Age in Years?

LTCOL

COL

Enlisted

Civilian

Number of years you have been in Communications career field (include prior
enlisted time)?
Please select your Highest Level of Educational degree obtained?
High School Associates Bachelors
Masters
Doctoral
How many years have you been working with computers?
Approximate percentage of your duty day spent on a computer?
< 25%
25% - 50%
50% - 75%
75% - 100%
Approximate number of off-duty hours spent on the computer per week
None
1–5
6 - 10
11 – 20
> 20
How many online classes or online training courses have you taken before?
Including classes taken during duty and off-duty time.

57

Appendix C
Introduction Knowledge Test – Session 1

***Correct responses are in bold text

1. Studies have shown that up to ______ of all job applicants, no matter what field
or position, have lied on their resumes.
a) 10%
b) 25%
c) 40%
d) 75%
2. The concept that deceivers are not able to control indicators pointing to their
dishonesty is the idea behind:
a) leakage theory
b) interpersonal deception theory
c) truth bias
d) immediacy theory
3. Typically, people successfully detect deception about ______ of the time.
a) 20%
b) 50%
c) 80%
d) 90%
4. In terms of detecting deception, the downside of being suspicious is that it might
lead to:
a) less detection accuracy
b) more false alarms
c) more truth bias
d) poor cognitive processing
5. A simple way to define deception is:
a) a message that is inaccurate in its content and assumptions
b) a message that is purposely used to foster a false conclusion in others
c) a message that contradicts the beliefs of the majority of society
d) a message that blatantly breaks the norms of a society’s culture
6. Past studies of deception detection were:
a) limited in the amount of interaction between communicators
b) highly dynamic in nature
c) conducted using large groups of people
d) looked at deceptive communication of long periods of time
7. Which of the following would NOT directly lead to better detection accuracy?
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a) familiarity with the communicative sender
b) experience using with the communicative medium
c) familiarity with the topic of conversation
d) experience in high-risk situations
8. The tendency for most human beings to believe other people are honest by default
is known as the __________.
a) trust bias
b) truth bias
c) lie bias
d) gullibility bias
9. In response to the question “How much experience do you have driving
commercial vehicles?”, the dishonest response of “Yes, I have driven a dump
truck” would be an example of what type of deception?
a) fabrication
b) concealment
c) equivocation
d) misconception
10. Which of the following is NOT a reliable visual indicator of deception?
a) increased blinking
b) smiling
c) pupil dilation
d) self-grooming
11. Which of the following is NOT a linguistic property?
a) the use of pronouns
b) submissive language
c) temporal distancing
d) voice pitch
12. An example of the adaptor clue would be:
a) shuffling feet
b) clearing the throat
c) increased voice pitch
d) grooming the hair
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Cues Knowledge Test – Session 2
1. The theory that suggests deceivers will be unable to control all of their behavior
while lying is:
a) interpersonal deception theory
b) indicator theory
c) cognitive effort theory
d) leakage theory
2. Deceivers are apt to display _______ -based cues if the consequences of having a
lie detected are perceived to be severe.
a) arousal
b) emotion
c) cognitive
d) tactical
3. With regard to deception, we would expect ________ messages as more likely to
be dishonest.
a) longer
b) shorter
c) uninterrupted
d) content rich
4. The type of deceptive cue known as a “leveler” refers to:
a) a glaring lack of detail
b) voice pitch fluctuation
c) responding to a question with a question
d) over-generalizing terms like “everyone”
5. If asked “Have you seen Joe’s missing wallet?”, a deceiver using the delay tactic
of tag questions would respond with:
a) “What are you implying?”
b) “That’s too bad for Joe, isn’t it?”
c) “Who are you to ask me such a question?”
d) “Why should I have seen it? Of course not.”
6. Which of the following would NOT be a reliable cue pointing toward deception?
a) poor detail in a particular message
b) non-ah nonfluencies
c) lower voice pitch
d) less positive emotion
7. Deceivers tend to use or switch to ________ in their messages.
a) past tense verbiage
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b) faster speaking tempo
c) more detailed explanations
d) formal names and places
8. The use of terms like “maybe, perhaps, could have” is the linguistic property
known as:
a) leveling
b) immediacy
c) hedging
d) rephrasing
9. “Response latencies” refer to:
a) stuttering during a message
b) a pause before beginning a message
c) an attempt to change the subject before addressing it
d) using “uh’s” and “ah’s” during a message
10. Which of the following is a reasonably reliable indicator pointing toward
deception?
a) vocal pleasantness
b) limited body movement
c) monotone speaking
d) unusual details
11. It is possible that a deceiver is having a difficult time lying if we notice him
_________.
a) respond immediately after being asked a question
b) fail to maintain eye contact with others
c) behave in a normal manner
d) drop the names of others into conversation
12. When relating a past event, an honest communicator is less likely to:
a) report on his or her emotional state at the time of the event
b) report on unusual details about the event
c) report on the verbatim discussion of those at the event
d) leave out the names of people at the event
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Heuristics Knowledge Test – Session 3
1. Heuristics refer to __________.
a) mental shortcuts used to quickly judge the truthfulness of information
b) highly reliable rules for judging the truthfulness of information
c) strategies used by deceivers to successfully lie to others
d) methods used for accessing information that may contradict another
person’s statements
2. The tendency for most human beings to perceive most incoming information as
truthful is known as the __________.
a) trust bias
b) truth bias
c) plausibility bias
d) lie bias
3. Availability bias refers to:
a) judging the reliability of an occurrence based on common, similar
occurrences
b) basing the validity of a statement on the reliability of its source
c) basing the validity of a statement on how accessible supporting
information is
d) judging the veracity of a person on how available they make themselves to
others
4. An interviewer who believes the applicants he personally interviewed more than
those who did not interview the applicants:
a) interview bias
b) truth bias
c) lie bias
d) probing bias
5. We are more likely to believe “the painful truth” from our friends than from
strangers because of the:
a) truth bias
b) familiarity bias
c) friendliness bias
d) framing bias
6. A person who constantly scratches his arms and generally appears nervous may
trigger our _______ when judging him as untruthful.
a) lie bias
b) nonverbal conspicuousness bias
c) framing bias
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d) plausibility bias
7. When an receiver incorrectly judges a truthful piece of information as being
untruthful, that would be scored as a _______.
a) hit
b) miss
c) false alarm
d) correct rejection
8. Deceiving someone by submitting a false initial value for them to work from is
exploiting their:
a) framing bias
b) anchoring & adjustment
c) plausibility bias
d) representativeness bias
9. The tendency to treat content that sounds believable on its face as truthful is:
a) framing bias
b) anchoring & adjustment
c) plausibility bias
d) representativeness bias
10. A person who distrusts nearly everyone upon meeting them (bordering on
paranoia) is susceptible to:
a) familiarity bias
b) arousal bias
c) probing bias
d) lie bias
11. If a sixteen-year old introduces herself as a medical doctor, whether honestly or
not, we might be suspicious because of:
a) unexpectedness bias
b) familiarity bias
c) availability bias
d) expert opinion bias
12. Framing bias refers to:
a) being influenced by an initial value from which to work
b) being influenced by the way a problem is worded
c) being influenced by the consequences of a decision
d) being influenced by the amount of risk involved with a problem
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Appendix D
Example: Judgment Accuracy Description Handout (from Test 1a)
There are six conversations in this test. Each conversation may be a videotaped interview,
an interview with only audio, or a piece of text from an online chat or a transcript of
interviews. Some conversations are truthful but others are deceptive. Please carefully
assess the conversations, and try to identify whether they are truthful or deceptive. You
have 15 minutes to finish this test.
Question 1: This is an audio recording from an interview. The interviewer is asking the
interviewee "Please describe your educational background." Please listen to the
interviewee's answer carefully, and identify whether his/her answer is truthful or
deceptive.
Question 2: This is a transcript from a face-to-face interview. The interviewer (Q) is
asking the interviewee (A) “What event from your childhood do you remember most
fondly?” Please read the interviewee's answer carefully, and identify whether his/her
answer is truthful or deceptive.
Conversation:

Q: Uh, what event from your childhood do you remember most fondly?
A: Mm, that's a tough one, most fondly, oh, it would probably be um, the Wisconsin
State Fair, I got a red and white teddy bear about this high. won it myself, no one
had to win it for me.
Q: You won that by yourself, how'd you do that?
A: Throwing darts, at balloons
Q: Mmm.
A: Popping balloons
Question 3: This is a video recording from an interview. The interviewer is asking the
interviewee "Please describe your current or last occupation." Please watch the
interviewee's answer carefully, and identify whether his/her answer is truthful or
deceptive.
Question 4: This is an audio recording from an interview. The interviewer is asking the
interviewee "How ambitious are you?" Please watch the interviewee's answer carefully,
and identify whether his/her answer is truthful or deceptive.
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Question 5: This is a video recording from an interview. The interviewer is asking the
interviewee "Please describe a typical day of your work." Please watch the interviewee's
answer carefully, and identify whether his/her answer is truthful or deceptive.
Question 6: This is a transcript from a face-to-face interview. The interviewer (Q) is
asking the interviewee (A) “What types of people tend to rub you the wrong way?”
Please read the interviewee's answer carefully, and identify whether his/her answer is
truthful or deceptive.
Conversation:

Q: Um, what types of people tend to rub you the wrong way?
A: ......mm, let's see uh, there's a million types of people, uh, umm, let me think:
controlling.
Q: Why?
A: People that control me.
Q: Are we talking, total control or are we talking, um, basically are you, this is just a
general broad based, be, give me an example, give me a situation when you consider
A: Anyone that has control over me
Q: You're in the army, you're being controlled everyday
A: Yeah, like I said there are numerous types of those people i don't like
Q: But then you're saying that you don't like any of your superiors.
A: I just don't like people who control me.
Q: But you put up with the military, you're, as high ranked as you are.
A: Yeah, I know. But they, like you said, you asked me if they rub me the wrong
way, so I, anybody, I like to be in control and when somebody has control over me,
they rub me the wrong way."
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